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Abstract 
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Financial Inclusion - access to financial products by households and firms - is one of the main albeit challenging 
priorities, both for Advanced Economies (AEs) as well as Emerging Markets (EMs), even more so for the latter. 
Financial inclusion facilitates consumption smoothing, lowers income inequality, enables risk diversification, and 
tends to positively affect economic growth. Financial stability is another rising priority among policy makers. 
This is evident in the re-emergence of macroprudential policies after the global financial crisis, minimizing 
systemic risk, particularly risks associated with rapid credit growth. However, there are significant policy trade-
offs that could exist between both financial inclusion and financial stability, with mixed evidence on the link 
between the two objectives. Given the importance of macroprudential policies as a toolbox to achieve financial 
stability, we examine the impact of macroprudential policies on financial inclusion - a potential cause for financial 
instability if not carefully implemented. Using panel regressions for 67 countries over the period 2000-2014, our 
results point to mixed effects of macroprudential policies. The usage (and tightening) of some tools, such as the 
debt-to-income ratio, appear to reduce financial inclusion whereas others, such as the required reserve ratio (RRR), 
increase it. Specifically, both institutional quality and financial development appear to increase the effectiveness 
of macroprudential policies on financial inclusion. Institutional quality helps macroprudential policies boost 
financial inclusion, with mixed effects as a result of financial development, but the results are more significant 
when we include either institutional quality or financial development. This leads us to believe that macroprudential 
policies conditional on better institutional quality and financial development improves financial inclusion. This 
has important policy implications for financial stability. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial inclusion - access to, and use of, financial products and services by households or 
firms -  is one of the main, albeit challenging priorities in Emerging Markets (EMs), and a key 
factor for financial development1. Regional blocs2 and international financial organizations, 
including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, and 
the African Development Bank, are among the many entities currently prioritizing access to 
finance. Financial inclusion units, both within Central Banks, and Finance Ministries, have 
been on the rise, and bolstering access to finance has become an issue that has been repeatedly 
addressed in various G-20 statements (see Beck, 2016)).3 Over the last decade, the global 
average of ATMs per 100,000 adults has increased by at least two thirds,4 while the global 
average of holders - especially for depositing purposes - has more than doubled (IMF, 2018), 
as shown in Figure (1).  
Figure (1): Evolution in Financial Inclusion Trends Over the Last Decade 
 
                                                             
1 The literature on financial inclusion over the last decade established that financial development goes well beyond economic 
growth (see for example Beck, 2016), Levine, 2005, and Beck, 2009), with financial development contributing to improved 
income distribution, and reduced poverty (Beck, 2016), even if financial inclusion was lagging 
2 G20, APEC, ASEAN, and GCC. 
3 Yet, still over half of the central banks globally have no financial inclusion mandate, but rather objectives related to financial 
inclusion (Tissot and Gadanecz, 2017). 
4 From 30 in 2004, to almost 50 in 2015.  
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Source: IMF Financial Access Survey (via IMF, 2018)  
Financial inclusion is of key importance, particularly to EMs and frontier markets whose levels 
of financial development, as well as access to finance, are well below those of advanced 
economies. Financial inclusion can thus help consumption smoothing with significant welfare 
gains (see, for example, Jappelli and Pagano, 1989; Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997; Ludvigson, 
1999), and help in lowering income inequality by increasing the income of the poorest quintile 
(Beck et al., 2007), thus boosting savings (Dupas and Robinson, 2013). Moreover, it can act as 
a lever to reduce the significant rise in extreme global inequality (IMF, 2018), while playing a 
crucial part in risk diversification and building trust in the financial system, (Cihak et Al., 
2016), something that EM and frontier economies lack. Its contribution, therefore, when it 
comes to growth (IMF, 2016), as well as in terms of alleviating poverty and inequality, cannot 
be ignored. Ideally, financial inclusion should ensure the sufficient provision of financial 
services to households, corporates, and governments, in order to improve individual (and 
overall) welfare (Beck, 2016), without jeopardizing financial stability.  
Conversely, financial stability is another priority among global policy makers (see Basel III, 
and the Financial Stability Board, for example), and macroprudential policies have re-emerged 
as an important policy tool for achieving financial stability and minimizing risks (systemic, 
mainly) created by rapid credit growth.5 However, policy trade-offs could exist between both 
financial inclusion and financial stability (see Gould and Melecky, 2017 and Tissot and 
Gadanecz, 2017). On the one hand, increased usage of macroprudential policies lowers credit 
growth in the quest to achieve financial stability,6 even though one of the less discussed 
priorities of both financial stability and macroprudential policies is the stable provision of 
financial intermediation services7  to the economy (Bank of England, 2009).  On the other, a 
rapid increase in financial inclusion (via credit expansion) can jeopardize financial stability, as 
not all borrowers may be creditworthy. The global financial crisis, triggered by the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage crisis, is the epitome of this jeopardy whereby excessive borrowing, and thus 
more financial inclusion, implied less financial stability. Among EMs, there was the 2010 
Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis (India) as a consequence of the rapid growth of 
microfinance entities in South India. Both crises provide examples of a deteriorating financial 
sector, or non-financial sector balance sheets, as a result of increased financial inclusion. There 
                                                             
5 More broadly, any risks that can jeopardize the health of the banking/financial sector.  
6 Refer to Chapter Two for the relevant literature.  
7 Specifically highlighting payment services, credit intermediation and insurance against risk in the quest to circumvent boom-
bust cycles in liquidity and credit supply in a similar manner to the global financial crisis (Galati and Moessner, 2011). 
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is also a possibility that financial inclusion affects the transmission of monetary policies, 
adversely affecting financial stability (see Mehrotra and Yetman, 2015). Hence, there could be 
unintended, or indirect, consequences of an inappropriate implementation of policies and 
targets (Cihak et al., 2016; Ayyagari et al., 2017).   
Given the importance of managing credit cycles, particularly through the use of 
macroprudential policies, the aim is to examine the link between macroprudential policies and 
financial inclusion, both in AEs, and EMs. There has been an increase in the literature on the 
link between financial inclusion and financial stability (see Han and Melecky, 2013, and 
Morgan and Pontines, 2014, for example). However, to our knowledge, the link between 
financial inclusion and macroprudential policies is barely examined.8 The reason we focus on 
financial inclusion is twofold: first, the rising literature on both the redistributive and 
unintended consequences of macroprudential policies9 attempts to examine their impact on-
income inequality. Second, the IMF (2018) and others, established that financial inclusion does 
reduce income inequality.10  Thus we aim to tackle several of the ongoing issues surrounding 
macroprudential policies that have not been sufficiently examined in the literature. Specifically, 
we will address the following questions:  
1. How do changes in the various types of macroprudential policies affect financial 
inclusion? 
2.  How does the level of financial development and institutional quality - both 
important factors for financial inclusion - influence the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies?  
Given the rising literature on the redistributive impact of macroprudential policies and their 
impact on income inequality, we focus on household financial inclusion11 by examining both 
                                                             
8Financial Development and Macroprudential Policies has been touched upon in the literature, but not the question of 
financial inclusion (Baskaya et. al., 2016)  
 Recently there is a rise in the literature that examines the redistributive impact of macroprudential policies, both theoretically 
and empirically. Empirically, the focus has been on income inequality, which we briefly touch upon given the rising literature 
on inequality and financial conclusion. The closest paper to this chapter is that of Ayyagari et al. (2017) that examines the 
impact of macroprudential policies on firm-financing and discusses the intended consequences of macroprudential policies.  
9 As macroprudential policies primarily target financial stability, the implementation of macroprudential policies may have 
spill-over effects on variables that were not primarily target. See Ayyagari et al. (2017) for an example; smaller firms adversely 
affected by macroprudential policies relative to larger firms.  
10 With more work done on financial deepening, for example, has been found - both theoretically and empirically to play a 
crucial role in alleviating poverty in Emerging Markets (EMs). Within this context, the largest, and most immediate effect on 
welfare is obtained as a result of boosting to access to payment services, or access to finance, more broadly, and financial 
inclusion.  (see Beck (2016))  
11 We are also working on enterprise access to finance, building on the work of Ayyagari et al. (2017), but this is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.  
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aspects of financial inclusion: access and usage of financial services. Making this distinction 
is important, as access, in terms of availability of financial services does not imply their usage 
- borrowing, and depositing - by households.12 In this case, financial access, the broadest sense 
of which is owning an account at a formal financial institution, is necessary for financial 
inclusion. However, it is insufficient for using formal financial services (Pal and Pal, 2012). 
We aim to answer these questions by using various macroprudential variables that capture the 
usage of these tools, and whether these tools have been tightened or loosened, to understand 
their dynamics.  
Section II briefly highlights the recent trends in financial inclusion globally; section III reviews 
the relevant literature; section IV outlines the data used for our estimation; section V explains 
the methodology employed; section VI presents our results; and section VII presents our 
conclusions.  
2. Recent Trends in Financial Inclusion13 
EMs14 have been characterized by lower levels of financial development relative to AEs. The 
fact that most of EMs’ financial systems continue to be bank-based meant that financial 
inclusion is lower among these economies relative to AEs. There is also a preference for using 
informal financial services - the most basic form of which is borrowing from family - due to 
the lack of trust in the formal financial system. The high collateral requirements, low share of 
firms with credit and high borrowing costs, constrain financial inclusion efforts, particularly 
among frontier markets, even relative to EMs (Dabla-Norris, 2015).15  
In the last decade, prioritizing financial inclusion has led to newer datasets that attempt to 
capture access to finance at more disaggregated levels beyond merely account ownership, 
which still remains an important tool to gauge progress on financial inclusion. As Figure 1 
shows, accounts in financial institutions are still the main driver behind financial inclusion, 
with mobile money accounts on the rise among developing countries. Yet this trend is not 
uniform (see Figure 4) and the pace of account ownership has been much faster in some 
countries (Egypt and India) compared to others (Philippines and Mexico), while remaining 
largely unchanged in EMs between 2014-2017 (World Bank, 2018). 
                                                             
12 Pal and Pal (2012) note that usage of financial services may not occur even if there is access due to the lower cost of informal 
financial services, and the higher price of financial services relative to other good.  
13 Data and Charts for this section are obtained from the World Bank’s 2017 Findex Database (World Bank, 2018) 
14 And frontier markets 
15 However, data on macroprudential policies in lower-income and frontier market is not available, so we exclude them from 
our estimations when splitting the sample within our robustness checks.  
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Figure 1: Financial institution accounts is the main driver behind growth in account 
ownership since 2011 
 
Source: 2017 Global Findex Database   
Despite the rise in account ownership, Figure 2 shows that poorer adults are less likely to own 
an account compared to richer adults, with a global gap of almost 13%. Specifically, 74% 
among the richest 60% globally have a bank account, whereas only 61% among the poorest 
40% of households do. This gap is even larger, at 15%, among developing countries. Figure 2 
also shows the countries with a gap in account ownership between rich and poor households, 
both among economies with high account ownership – such as Brazil and China (with a 20% 
gap between rich and poor adults), as well as those with low account ownership (such as Egypt 
and Indonesia, with a gap of also around 20%). Such gaps do not exist in high-income countries 
except for some, such as Israel (World Bank, 2018).  
Figure 2: Lower likelihood of Poorer Adults to Own an Account, with a Larger Gap of 
Account Ownership among Developing Countries 
Source: 2017 Global Findex Database   
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Figure 3 shows that this gap in account ownership has barely changed since 2011. Richer adults 
were 17% more likely to have an account compared to poorer adults since 2011. However, this 
gap slightly tapered among developing countries, decreasing from around 20% to around 14% 
in 2014, and stabilizing since then (World Bank, 2018). 
Figure 3: Minor Changes in the Gaps in Account Ownership Between the Richer and 
the Poorer Over Time: Adults with an Account (%) 
 
Source: 2017 Global Findex Database   
Figure 4 highlights the varying progress in financial inclusion among EMs, with the share of 
adults owning a bank account almost doubling over the period 2011-2017 (see, for example, 
the case of India and Egypt). Other countries, however, saw smaller change in account 
ownership, as in the case of Pakistan and the Philippines (World Bank, 2018). 
Figure 4: Varying Progress Towards Account Ownership Among EMs 
 
Source: 2017 Global Findex Database   
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3. Literature Review 
Our literature review is focused on the determinants of financial inclusion as well as the 
redistributive impact of macroprudential policies. The literature on financial inclusion uses 
several types of data to capture both the determinants and the effects of financial inclusion 
(Fowowe, 2017). It is important to highlight the findings on the links between financial 
inclusion and inequality, as well as inclusion and financial stability, as our questions lie within 
the core of those two strands when linking financial inclusion to macroprudential policies.16 
We will briefly highlight the effects of financial inclusion, as well as the transmission channels 
- both direct and indirect - through which it affects financial stability and inequality. We will 
then review the literature on the determinants of financial inclusion.  
3.1. Transmission Channels between Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability 
1- Direct Channels: Financial inclusion can enhance the efficiency of financial 
intermediation by increasing both savings and the amount and value of transactions, 
improving investment cycles. The increased intermediation of domestic savings and 
the greater access to bank deposits boost the resilience of the deposit funding base 
of the banking sector, particularly during times of stress. This occurs by lowering 
the likelihood of correlated deposit withdrawals. Financial inclusion also improves 
banking sector liquidity (due to increased deposits) and lowers liquidity risks 
(Prasad, 2010, OCC, 2012, and Han and Melecky, 2013). All this improves the 
balance sheets of both households and corporates, as well as the banking sector.  
2- Indirect Channels: Financial inclusion enhances the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, as a greater proportion of economic activity comes under the umbrella of 
the interest rate channel, and financial exclusion impedes the transmission 
mechanism of an inflation targeting policy, potentially lowering inflation (Mehrotra 
and Yetman, 2015, Lenka and Bairwa, 2016, and Brownbridge et Al., 2017).17 This 
is particularly significant as we argue that the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policies in financially underdeveloped markets is dampened, as financial inclusion 
levels are small in these economies.18  Also, since informal financial services could 
                                                             
16 A detailed analysis of these links is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it well worth highlighting, to shed on the broader 
strands within which this chapter lies.  
17 Related to this is the argument of Granville and Mallick (2009) that inflation targeting is beneficial for financial stability.  
18 Along those lines, Boar et el. (2017) held that macroprudential measures are more effective if both financial development is 
sufficiently large.  
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constitute a source of financial instability (Cull et Al., 2012),19 reducing access to 
such informal services may lead to lower financial instability.  
It is important to note that the literature on between financial inclusion and financial stability 
is still in its infancy; an opposing, though less common view also exists, according to which 
increased inclusion reduces financial stability (Mehrotra and Yetman, 2015) if inclusion leads 
to rapid credit growth20. There is also the argument that the link between financial inclusion 
and financial stability depends on the measure of financial inclusion under consideration.21 
3.2. Determinants of Financial Inclusion 
The literature on financial inclusion highlights several types of data that capture the 
determinants - and effects - of financial inclusion (Fowowe, 2017). First, there are cross-
sectional studies that combine household or firm-level data with macroeconomic indicators of 
financial development, as well as inclusion (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, Beck et 
al., 2006 and 2008b, and Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006). Second, there are country-specific 
studies that merge firm-level data and access data with financial development (Butler and 
Cornaggia, 2011 and Grima et al., 2008). Third, some studies use firm-level data22 on several 
indicators that capture access to financial markets (Beck et al., 2005, Ayyagari et al., 
2008, Dinh et al., 2010, Aterido and Hallward-Driemeier, 2010, Aterido et al., 2011, and 
Fowowe, 2017). The first set of studies are of the highest interest; however, we touch upon 
some of the main findings of the other two sets, for reference purposes. Although the impact 
of financial inclusion is beyond the scope of this analysis, it is important to note that despite 
the recent increase in the research on this topic and the fact that financial inclusion is a top 
policy agenda, there is still an unclear link between financial inclusion and macroeconomic 
outcomes (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017).   
                                                             
19Cull et Al. (2012) give the example of pyramid schemes that are set up as means of informal savings and investment 
opportunities could trigger social, and political unrest, as well a lack of confidence in the traditional banking system, already 
a common characteristic among EMs, and frontier economies.  
20 Particularly if it leads to greater bank exposure to low quality/not creditworthy borrowers. 
21 For more information on the link between financial stability and financial inclusion, see Aiyar et al. (2016), Sahay et al. 
(2015), Morgan and Pontines (2014), and Lopez and Winkler (2016). The latter is particularly interesting as they show how 
financial inclusion could have helped moderate the credit crunch during the global financial crisis.  
22 Mainly from the World Bank - based on firm responses (Fowowe, 2017). 
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Until recently, and mainly due to limited data availability,23 most empirical research focused 
on financial development24 rather than financial inclusion and income inequality.25 As the 
literature on the determinants of financial inclusion is still at a relatively early stage,26 financial 
development was assumed automatically to lead to financial inclusion. This, however, is not 
necessarily the case. We argue that financial development is necessary but insufficient for 
financial inclusion. Relatedly, Evans (2015) holds that while financial development has 
increased over the last decade among African countries, the breadth and coverage of formal 
finance is still well below their peers.27 In this context, most studies on financial inclusion focus 
primarily on EMs, and frontier markets, using mainly country-specific data rather than cross-
country analysis.28  
Once again, financial inclusion and financial development are two distinct concepts, both of 
which are of huge importance, with existing overlaps.  Financial inclusion is normally captured 
by ownership of an account by households (and enterprises,) either at a financial institution, or 
even through a mobile money service provider.29 Financial development, however, is measured 
by broader macro-level indicators that capture both bank and non-bank size, as well as health 
and efficiency of the financial sector.30 Financial development is also a necessary condition for 
financial inclusion, but is insufficient if financing constraints prevent households and firms 
from using the available financial services.  Among the first studies to address the question of 
financial inclusion beyond the greater scope of financial development was that of Beck et al. 
(2007b). Using data for banking sector outreach31 for 99 countries over the period 2003-2004, 
they found that institutional quality affects financial inclusion positively, while the degree of 
                                                             
23 Data collection efforts on financial inclusion began around 2004 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017) 
24 Financial development is a process by which funds are efficiently channelled from savers to borrowers, by reducing 
information, and transaction costs. A lot of work during the last decade has attempted to measure financial development. For 
more information, see the World Bank (2008). Common indicators that have been used to capture financial development 
typically cantered on indicators related to financial depth, and efficiency. For more information on financial development, and 
how it is measured, see World Economic Forum (2008) 
25 For more information, see King and Levine 1993; Beck et al. 2000; Clark et al. 2006; Beck et al. 2007; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2009.  
26 The more common strand of literature focuses on financial development, while access is lumped as part of it.  
27 Other EMs and frontier markets. 
28 As is more commonly the case, with the broader literature on financial development.    
29 Demirguc-Kunt (2017) elaborates further that accounts can be either a deposit or transaction account to be used to make and 
receive payments, store, and save money. Inclusion as such also includes access to credit for borrowing purposes, and the use 
of insurance products to better manage financial risks. 
30 For a comprehensive list of variables comprising financial development, see the World Economic Forum (2008). Financial 
development generally refers to the size and depth of an economy’s financial markets, both banks and non-banks (equity, bond 
markets, insurance markets, as well as shadow banks as examples).  
31 Covering both access and use of financial services indicators. 
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government ownership of banks has a negative effect.32 33 Other determinants of financial 
inclusion include GDP per capita, governance, and the institutional quality and the regulatory 
environment.  (Rojas-Suarez, 2010, Karlan et al., 2013, Park and Mercado, 2015, and Allen et 
al., 2016,). 
Some of the most interesting studies on the determinants of financial inclusion include that of 
Sarma and Pais (2008), who employ data for 49 countries to study the determinants of financial 
inclusion. They find that higher GDP per capita, physical infrastructure34, telephone and 
internet subscriptions, financial development, and adult literacy have a positive and significant 
impact on financial inclusion. However, a higher percentage of rural population, a high share 
of foreign bank ownership, non-performing loans, as well as highly capitalized banking 
systems - as measured by the capital asset ratio (CAR) - were inversely associated with 
financial inclusion. The authors conclude that there is an element of cautiousness associated 
with lending when it comes to banks with a high CAR.   
Honohan (2008) uses financial access data for 160 countries within an OLS context and finds 
that increased mobile phone penetration35 and better institutional quality (as well as 
governance) are positively correlated with their access variables - the number of bank accounts 
per 100 adults - even when per capita income is controlled for. Another important factor is 
greater proximity to financial intermediaries, which could also be in line with Honohan and 
King’s (2009) result that mobile phone penetration matters for higher household financial 
penetration ratios. Generally, levels of economic development and financial inclusion are 
highly correlated (Sarma and Pais 2011), suggesting that for more developed economies, fewer 
unbanked households36 are to be expected.  
Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot’s (2012) study examines the link between financial development 
and access to finance, and specifically whether banking and capital market characteristics can 
increase banks’ ability to increase credit to the private sector while boosting financial inclusion. 
Using data for 138 countries over the period 2002-2009, they employed GMM and panel vector 
error correction models.37 They found that financial development – evidenced by more 
                                                             
32 Other control variables that had a positive impact on inclusion - or outreach as the authors refer to it - have been the log of 
GDP per capita, as well as indicators capturing infrastructure, and communications (telephone mainlines).  
33 However, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2015) highlight the role that governments can play in fostering financial inclusion, by 
transforming government payments from cash into bank (and ever more recently into mobile) accounts.  
34 Such as a country’s network of paved roads. 
35 Related to this is the rising literature on the role of digital payments in raising income and promoting financial inclusion. 
For more information, see Beck (2016). 
36 Or more financial inclusion, and less financial exclusion. 
37 Credit results are beyond the scope of this chapter, so we only report the financial inclusion related results.  
 13 
developed equity markets – increases access to finance as they offer opportunities for banks to 
develop tools to increase access to their supply and services. They also found that a larger 
banking sector size hinders access to finance, and smaller banks with strong proximity to their 
clients are better for financial inclusion.  The health, as well as efficiency of the banking sector 
is hugely important in terms of access to finance, particularly lower NPLs and higher bank 
capital to asset ratio, and lower fees on deposit accounts. Institutional quality was also found 
to be a determinant for access to finance, and they found that an increase in Tier 1 bank capital 
asset ratio had a negative impact on credit. This implied that while higher capital requirements 
were effective in lowering credit boom related vulnerabilities, lower credit expansion meant 
lower financial inclusion. It is very important to note that Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot’s (2012) 
paper is one of the few - to our knowledge - that linked financial inclusion to macroprudential 
policy. Beyond capital market development, the authors find that macroprudential regulation38 
(as measured by tier 1 banking capital asset ratios as a proxy for capital requirements) is 
important for financial stability; however, it lowers financial inclusion, via lower credit 
extensions. 
Another strand of the literature on financial inclusion focuses on country or region-specific 
studies. Pal and Pal (2012) employed maximum likelihood in the 35 States and Union 
Territories in India, and found that per capita income is an important determinant of 
households’ propensity to use formal financial services. They also found that the increased 
availability of banking services boosts financial inclusion, especially among the poor. Other 
determinants of financial inclusion include education, employment status, and household size. 
In particular, household income and employment status have the strongest effect on financial 
inclusion in urban areas in India.   
Fungáčová and Weill (2015) use the 2011 World Bank Global Findex database to study the 
determinants of financial inclusion in China, compared to other BRICS countries. They find 
that higher income, improved education, and being an older male are linked to an increased use 
of formal accounts and formal credit in China. Educational attainment and income tend to affect 
the use of alternative sources of borrowing.39 Tuesta et al. (2015) used a series of probit 
                                                             
38 The authors held that more regulation is important to lower the likelihood of boom-bust cycles, especially in credit lending. 
A 1% increase in tier 1 banking to capital asset ratio has an adverse impact on credit, Thus increases in capital requirements - 
while efficient in lowering credit boom related vulnerabilities - lower credit growth.  
39 Borrowing from friends and family, borrowing from an employer, or another private lender.  
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models40 to study the determinants of financial inclusion in Argentina, and found that the level 
of education, income, and age are all important determinants of inclusion.   
Oyelami et al. (2017) studied the determinants of financial inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa 
using Panel Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL), and their proxy for financial inclusion 
were 1) depositors with commercial banks per 1,000 adults, and 2) borrowers from commercial 
banks per 1,000 adults. They found that financial inclusion is significantly influenced by both 
supply and demand side factors. Demand side factors include the level of income and literacy 
(primary school enrolment), while the supply side factors are the interest rates (both deposit 
and lending), and ATM usage as a proxy for bank innovation. GDP per capita was not found 
to have a positive impact on financial inclusion, which contradicts some of the earlier findings 
in the literature (Honohan and Beck,2007) and Sarma & Pais, 2011 for example).  41 
The determinants of financial inclusion in advanced economies have only recently become a 
subject of interest among policy makers and academics. Ampudia, and Ehrmann (2017) use 
household-level data for 14-euro area countries and the US, over the period 2009-2010, to study 
the determinants and effects of being unbanked in these areas. Using a probit model and a 
propensity score matching approach, they find that financial exclusion is common among low-
income, unemployed households, as well as households with low education. They also find that 
being banked significantly increases net wealth compared to those unbanked, with a gap of 
around €74,000 for the euro area, and USD 42,000 for the United States.42 Education, lower 
unemployment, and government policies that encourage the recipients of transfer payments to 
open bank accounts were found to be contributing to financial inclusion.  
4.  DATA 
Our analysis addresses financial inclusion using both measures that capture access to, and 
usage of, financial services. For variables related to financial access, we focus on ownership of 
an account, availability of bank branches, and ATM machines. We also capture access using 
variables that combine access to financial markets and financial institutions, as calculated by 
the IMF’s Financial Development Database (Svirydzenka, 2016), as a broader measure of 
                                                             
40 The authors hold that probit models allow the analysis of existing correlations between financial inclusion and certain 
variables of interest.  
41 Other control variables GDP per capita, CPI, institutional quality, trade openness (sum of exports and imports as a share 
of GDP) to capture the degree of international openness, and a measure of human capital captured by the logarithm of gross 
secondary enrolment rate (Zahonogo, 2017) 
42 This wealth difference is potentially caused by the fact that banked households are have a significantly higher potential to 
accumulate wealth by owning their primary residence. 
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financial access reflecting access to bond and equity markets. The IMF’s Financial 
Development Database includes bank branches and ATMs as their proxy for financial 
institutions access, while financial markets access is proxied by the percentage of market 
capitalization outside of the top 10 largest companies and the total number of issuers of debt 
(see Table 3 in Annex I for further details).  For variables related to usage of financial services, 
we use the number of borrowers and depositors with commercial banks per 1000 adults.  
We follow the literature for our explanatory variables and include the unemployment rate, 
education (proxied by secondary enrolment), urbanization, and openness in our baseline 
regressions. We also include a host of additional explanatory variables for robustness purposes. 
For our macroprudential variables, we follow Cerutti et al. (2015) and Shim et al. (2013) to 
capture the various macroprudential tools and their usage within a loosening and tightening 
context. Cerutti et al. (2015) use dummy variables to reflect the usage (1) of macroprudential 
policies versus their absence (0). Shim et al. (2013) use a positive scale to capture the number 
of tightening instances (2 for example, if the macroprudential tool of interest was tightened 
twice in the period of interest), a negative number to present a loosening instance (-3, if there 
were three loosening instances), and 0 if there was no change.  We supplement those databases 
with actual data on reserve requirements and provisioning to capture the magnitude of change 
of those two macroprudential policies rather than simply the use of dummy variables. The full 
list of macroprudential variables are presented in Table 4 in Annex I, reflecting the 32 measures 
employed.43  
The dataset is constructed as a cross-country panel44 using annual data over the period 2000-
2014. Beyond the macroprudential tools and the IMF Financial Development Database, the 
rest of our dependent variables and explanatory variables are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators database and the World Bank Financial Access Survey. The data set 
includes 67 AEs and EMs; 45  Table 1 in Annex I provides the list of countries included in the 
sample.  
 
                                                             
43 The 32 measures are not distinct. Most of those from Shim et al. (2013) are included in Cerutti’s (2015) database, but the 
former reflects instances of tightening and loosening, while the latter only has dummies to reflect their usage. We supplement 
these with actual RRRs to reflect the magnitude of changes in RRRs and their impacts. A similar effort was conducted for the 
collection of LTV ratios and provisioning, but data inconsistencies (including short time series availability) yielded 
inconclusive results for these variables. 
44 We also have cross-sectional results using ordinary least squares, and two staged least squares, but we focus on panel 
regressions in this chapter.  
45 We are cognizant that data on macroprudential regulation on frontier markets are not commonly available and most of them 
get dropped out of the sample, out of an original sample including 114 countries and an extensive effort to collect data on 
macroprudential policies for these countries. Robustness checks are thus only conducted for AEs and EMs.  
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5. Model Specification and Methodology 
The analysis of the relationship between macroprudential policies and financial inclusion is 
divided into two parts. First, we study the impact of the usage of various macroprudential 
policies on financial inclusion using measures to reflect access and usage of financial services. 
Second, we examine how financial development and institutional quality affect the relationship 
between macroprudential policies and financial inclusion.   
To analyze the impact of macroprudential policies, the following dynamic panel regression 
model of financial inclusion is used:  
!"#$%&'"(#),+ = α + 	ρ!"#$%&'"(#),+12 + 	βX5,6 + δ8((%5,6 +	ε5,6															(1) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t= 2000,…T 
where !"#$%&'"(#),+denotes the financial inclusion variable of interest as described below, 
!"#$%&'"(#),+12 is the autoregressive (lag) term of order one,46 Xit is the matrix of independent 
variables which includes the unemployment rate (%), urban population (% of total population), 
secondary school enrolment (% of gross), and openness. The variable Toolit represents the 
different macroprudential tools used by country i at time t, with variables such as the RRR, the 
LTV ratio, DTI ratio used inter-changeably to capture the impact of macroprudential policies, 
and εit is the error term of the regression.  
Our first measure of  !"#$%&'"(#),+ is the principal component of the IMF’s Financial 
Institutions Access variable and the Financial Markets Access variable as defined by 
Svirydzenka (2016) in the IMF’s index of financial development. In this case, Financial 
Institutions Access is a proxy of bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 
adults, while Financial Markets Access is a proxy of the percentage of market capitalization 
outside of the top-10 largest companies and the total number of issuers of debt (domestic, 
external, financial, and non-financial corporations). This variable aims to capture the ability of 
households and corporates to access financial services (Svirydzenka, 2017).  
Our second measure of !"#$%&'"(#),+ takes into account the number of ATMs, bank branches, 
and bank accounts,47 by solely focusing on access to financial institutions irrespective of 
financial markets, which was already captured in our first measure. To capture usage of 
financial services, our third measure of !"#$%&'"(#),+ include measures that capture borrowers 
                                                             
46 Lagged values are included to account for causality. 
47 Also, calculated as the Principal Component Analysis of ATMs, bank branches, and bank accounts. 
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and users. Specifically, we compute the principal component of borrowers at commercial banks 
per 1,000 adults, and depositors at commercial banks per 1,000 adults. We then re-estimate the 
equation for depositors and borrowers separately to understand the determinants of each 
variable separately. We thus end up with five dependent variables all of which capturing 
financial inclusion.48 We include the principal component of borrowers and depositors to 
capture usage of financial services broadly, in line with financial access.   
The hypothesis tested here is that macroprudential policies significantly affect financial 
inclusion. In other words, a macroprudential tightening (loosening) for country i will affect the 
different types of financial inclusion in our panel. Using the datasets from Cerutti et al. (2015), 
Shim et al. (2013), as well as actual data for the reserve requirements, we test for the 
effectiveness of a total of 32 macroprudential tools that capture the presence of macroprudential 
policies, as well as the ways in which they operate (in a tightening vs. loosening manner).   
For our panel regression, Equation 1 and its variations - using alternative dependent variables 
- will be estimated using the dynamic panel system General Method of Moments estimator 
(GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell, 
Bond, and Windmeijer (2000). The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Least Square 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimators cannot be used in the case of a dynamic panel data model. 
This is because the former would result in biased estimators, while the latter would result in 
inconsistent estimators (Hsiao, 2003). More specifically, the presence of a lagged endogenous 
variable suggests that correlation will exist between it and the error term, resulting in biased 
estimators; there is thus strong evidence suggesting that financial inclusion depends on its lags. 
Therefore, and as the GMM circumvents correlation problems (Yaffee, 2003), it will 
consistently estimate the dynamic panel data model (Kitazawa, 2003). 
To overcome the bias problems of the difference GMM methodology, it is important to follow 
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996), Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and 
Bond (1991). We estimate Equation 1 using the dynamic panel System GMM, as elaborated 
by Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer 
(2000).49 This is achieved by combining the standard set of moment conditions in first-
                                                             
48 Once again, our dependent variables are 1) Principal component of financial markets access and financial institutions access; 
2) principal component of ATMs, bank branches, and bank accounts to capture access only to financial institutions; 3) principal 
component of borrowers and depositors with commercial banks to capture usage of financial services; 4) depositors with 
commercial banks per 1000 adults, and 5) borrowers from commercial banks per 1000 adults. Variables 4 and 5 comprise 
variable 3.  
49 Other papers examining financial inclusion - within a financial stability context - that also employed System-GMM include 
Pontines and Morgan (2014).  
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difference and lagged levels as instruments with an additional set of moments conditions 
derived from the equation in levels. Thus, removing the unobserved fixed effects, we take the 
first difference of Equation 1 as follows: 
=!"#$%&'"(#),+ − !"#$%&'"(#),+12?
= α + 	ρ=!"#$%&'"(#),+ − !"#$%&'"(#),+12? + 	β=X5,6 − X5,612? + δ(8((%5,6
− 8((%5,612) 	+	(ε5,6 − ε5,612	)																																															(2)	 
Within the literature of financial development and access, Zahongo (2017) highlights the 
importance of using System GMM as a way to control for country specific effects and the 
endogeneity issue that may arise between the control variables and the endogenous variables 
(poverty, in their case).  Ahamed and Mallick (2017) highlight the importance of using system 
GMM in this context, where the lagged variables are used as instruments, thus optimizing the 
efficiency of the estimates with more moment conditions. Furthermore, the System GMM 
methodology assumes that the correlation between the dependent variable and the error term 
and the set of the independent variables and the error term is as follows: 
AB△ !"#$%&'"(#),+ , D),+E = 0, !(G	H = 2,… , 8 
											AB△ J),+D),+E = 0, !(G	H = 2,… , 8                                (3) 
where J),+ is the set of all the explanatory variables of Equation (1). In this context, this 
methodology offers a vigorous solution to the endogeneity bias, while being more rigorous in 
terms of measurement errors relative to cross-sectional regressions. Moreover, it continues to 
be consistent in spite of the possibility of endogenous explanatory variables, since E[Xt εs] ≠ 0 
for s ≤ t, if the instrumental variables are appropriately lagged (Pontines and Morgan, 2014). 
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is reported under each table. The null hypothesis 
assumes no autocorrelation, and the test for AR(2), which is normally more important, as it 
detects autocorrelation in levels (Neaime and Gaysset, 2018). We also check both the Sargan 
and Hansen tests to confirm that our model is correctly specified.  
Given the varying levels of institutional quality and financial development between AEs and 
EMs, we divide into two groups based on the IMF country definition of AEs and EMs, to see 
how the results differ. Furthermore, we re-estimate Equation 1 and its variations by introducing 
measures of financial development and institutional quality50 interacted with macroprudential 
                                                             
50 We only report the interacted terms between financial development and the various macroprudential tools, as well as the 
governance and macroprudential tools, as this is our main interest rather than the coefficient of each variable alone.  
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policies. This will help us understand how the results would differ in the presence of those two 
factors. Thus, Equation 1 will be re-estimated, also using System GMM, as follows: 
!"#$%&'"(#),+ = α + 	ρ!"#$%&'"(#),+12 + 	βX5,6 + δ8((%5,6 	+ ϑ(FinDev5,6 ∗ Tool5,6)
+		ε5,6															(4) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t= 2000,…T 
!"#$%&'"(#),+ = α + 	ρ!"#$%&'"(#),+12 + 	βX5,6 + δ8((%5,6 	+ ϑ(Governance5,6 ∗ Tool5,6)
+		ε5,6										(5) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t= 2000,…T 
FinDev5,6 in Equation 4 is our measure of financial development, calculated as a principal 
component of two variables that comprise the financial depth and financial efficiency within a 
country’s institutions and markets. These have been obtained from the IMF (2017) Financial 
Development Database. The Financial Depth indicator is a proxy for financial depth within 
financial institutions and financial markets, and is comprised of private sector credit to GDP, 
pension fund assets to GDP, mutual fund assets to GDP, stock market capitalization to GDP, 
stocks traded to GDP, international debt securities of government to GDP, total debt securities 
of financial corporations to GDP, and total debt securities of non-financial corporations to 
GDP. The financial institutions efficiency indicators reflects efficiency also within financial 
institutions and financial markets, and is a proxy of the net interest margin, lending-deposits 
spread, non-interest income to total income, overhead costs to total assets, return on assets, 
return on equity., and the stock market turnover ratio (stocks traded to capitalization). The IMF 
Financial Development Database provides an aggregate measure for financial institutions 
depth, financial institutions efficiency, as well as financial markets depth and efficiency. Once 
again, we calculate their principal component analysis; all of them should represent a country’s 
level of financial development.     
For institutional quality, we implement a principal component analysis to capture the World 
Bank’s six governance indicators that we use as a proxy for institutional quality. Variables in 
this database include rule of law, political stability, government effectiveness, voice and 
accountability, regulatory quality, and control of corruption.  
After conducting our System GMM estimations for equations 4 and 5, we report the total effect 
of governance and financial development, to capture the impact of macroprudential policies in 
the presence of either improved governance or financial development. This is estimated by 
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adding up the coefficient δ to the coefficient \, in equations 4 and 5 above, and their statistical 
significance is determined by their variances and covariances. 
6. Results 
Once again, we employed a total of 32 macroprudential policies- capturing their usage, as well 
as instances of loosening/tightening- to test for their impact on financial inclusion.51 We 
examined several aspects of financial inclusion to capture both financial access and usage of 
financial services.  We begin by highlighting our baseline regressions for the full sample, then 
we outline our results after splitting the sample into AEs and EMs, and then we proceed to 
discuss the role of institutional quality, proxied by governance indicators, and financial 
development in affecting the role of macroprudential policies. 
6.1.Baseline Regression Results 
Macroprudential policies yielded mixed results in terms of their impact on financial inclusion, 
with a number of insignificant results. In this section, we only report the macroprudential 
policies that yielded significant results - either positive or negative - on financial inclusion.52 
Tables (1) and (2) summarize53 the impact of the various macroprudential tools on financial 
inclusion - both access and usage. 
Table (1): Summary of Results: Access to Financial Services 
 
In terms of access, the use of provisioning as a macroprudential tool is the only tool that has a 
positive impact on access to financial services, within our entire sample, while tighter liquidity 
requirements and debt to income ratios lowered financial access. On dividing our sample 
                                                             
51The full list of macroprudential tools and a description of how they operate is available in the Annex to this chapter.  
52 The rest of our results - the insignificant ones - are available upon request. This is done in the interest of time/space.  
53 This table - and this section as a whole - only displays the significant results for our regressions. Additional results of the 
full (and insignificant) are available in the annex.  
Positive Impact Negative Impact Positive Impact Negative Impact Positive Impact Negative Impact
Provisioning
Tighter Liquidity 
Requirements
Tighter 
Provisionings
Usage/Tighter 
Provisionings
Dynamic 
Provisionings/Time-
Varying Provisioning
Tighter Debt to 
Income ratios
Tigher Required 
Reserve Ratios
Tighter Required 
Reserve Ratios
Limits on Foreign 
Currency Loans
Emerging MarketsFull Sample Advanced Economies
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between AEs and EMs markets, we see a slightly different pattern. For AEs, with already high 
levels of financial inclusion - and financial development overall - macroprudential policies do 
not contribute to increased financial access - captured by increased accounts, branches, or ATM 
machines, an expected result. Tighter provisioning, and tighter RRRs lowered access, however, 
in this case.  
For EMs, dynamic provisioning appeared to reduce financial access, while provisioning54 and 
RRRs increased access.55 One striking observation is that both provisioning and RRRs had a 
positive impact on financial access in EMs, and an adverse impact on access in AEs. Given the 
different levels of financial access - and broader financial development - between EMs and 
advanced economies, we thus are seeing differences in the results between both sub-groups. 
One broad conclusion we can draw from these results is that macroprudential policies in EMs 
- which tend to be financially underdeveloped - improves access, and it decreases it in AEs, 
with already high levels of access and financial intermediation.  
In terms of usage, Table (2) shows that most of the macroprudential policies employed had a 
positive impact on usage of financial services across our full sample- both in terms of the 
number of borrowers and depositors- and upon dividing our sample into EMs and AEs.  For 
the full sample, only taxes imposed on financial institutions only adversely affected the number 
of borrowers.  This could be a result of the fact that financial institutions pass on the additional 
taxes as fees on borrowers. For AEs, borrower-Targeted Instruments (LTV ratios and debt to 
income ratios) positively affected usage of financial services, particularly depositors.  No 
instrument appeared to adversely affect the usage of financial services among AEs. For EMs, 
tighter weights, and the use of RRRs had a positive impact on the usage of financial inclusion, 
while LTV caps, and dynamic provisioning lowered the usage of financial services.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
54 If not applied countercyclically. 
55 Similar to Pearlman (2015).  
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Table (2): Summary of Results: Usage (Borrowing and Depositing) of Financial Services 
Full Sample Advanced Economies Emerging Markets 
Positive Impact Negative Impact Positive Impact 
Negative 
Impact 
Positive Impact 
Negative 
Impact 
Provisioning; Limits on 
Domestic Currency 
Loans ; Financial-
Institutions Targeted 
Instruments (Aggregate 
Index) 
Taxes (adversely 
affects borrowers) 
Borrower Targeted 
Instruments (Aggregate 
Index) 
  
Tighter Reserve 
Requirements/Usage 
of RRRs 
LTV Caps 
Tighter/Countercyclical 
Reserve 
Requirements/Usage of 
RRRs (Domestic or 
FX);  
      
Tighter Risk 
Weights 
Dynamic 
Provisioning 
Tighter Taxes 
(positively affects 
Depositors) 
          
We now proceed to analyze the abovementioned results in more detail. Table (3) presents our 
baseline regression with the dependent variable, Financial Access56, which captures the ability 
of both individuals and enterprises to access financial services.  Once again, this variable is the 
principal component of the IMF’s Financial Institutions Access variable and Financial Markets 
Access variable to capture the ability to access the different financial institutions and market 
within an economy. Column (1) shows our baseline regression where Financial Access is 
regressed on its lag, which as expected is positive and significant at the 1% level. The 
unemployment rate displays a negative relationship, also as expected with financial inclusion, 
whereby a 1% increase in unemployment lowers financial access by 0.1-0.2%. This is a similar 
result to Ampudia, and Ehrmann (2017) whereby unemployment increases financial exclusion. 
Both urbanization and secondary enrolment exert a positive and significant impact on financial 
inclusion, although their magnitude is small. Openness - contrary to the literature (Zahonogo, 
2017) has a negative and significant impact on financial inclusion, but in only one of the 
regressions in this table.  
                                                             
56 Financial access and inclusion will be used interchangeably in this section.  
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The tightening of the debt to income ratio and the liquidity ratios lowered financial inclusion, 
shown in Columns (2) and (3). Any variable preceded by LT (Loosening/tightening) represents 
a variable that captures the change in the policy tools as described by Shim et al. (2013). 
Specifically, we find that a one-notch tightening in the debt-to-income ratio - which normally 
happens to restrict the provision of housing credit - lowers financial inclusion by 0.9%. The 
idea behind this tool is that financial authorities stipulate either 1) a specific percent of the 
borrower’s monthly income as the maximum amount of monthly repayments on a home loan; 
2) a specific multiple of the household’s income as the minimum debt-service - to-debt ratio; 
or 3) a shortening of the maturity of mortgage contracts or abolishing any preferential interest 
rates for mortgage loans (Shim et al., 2013). This result supports Shim et al’s (2013) argument 
any of the above-mentioned actions that would raise (or tighten) the debt to income ratio, raises 
the debt repayments of borrowers, which forces them to borrow less. We also find that a one 
notch tightening in the liquidity requirement - the minimum ratio for highly liquid assets that 
ensure that banks can endure episodes of severe cash outflows in situations of distress in 
Column (2) also lowers financial inclusion by 1%.  
Similarly, tighter liquidity appears to have a slightly larger impact on inclusion, whereby a one 
notch tightening in the liquidity ratio reduces financial inclusion by 1%. Generally, tighter 
liquidity requirements imply that banks are required to hold an adequate stock of high quality 
liquid assets to mitigate instances of distressed funding, which could adversely affect the 
volume of lending (Berben et al., 2010).57 Column (4) introduces a measure that captures the 
dynamic provisioning, which shows that tighter provisioning - when introduced in a 
countercyclical manner - increases financial inclusion.58 Thus, as dynamic provisioning 
reduces the procyclicality in the financial sector (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero, 2010), 
the higher the financial inclusion, by 0.6%.59  Columns (2), (3), and (4) show that the statistical 
significance of the other explanatory variables - except for openness - is preserved with the 
introduction of macroprudential tools. 
                                                             
57 Ultimately affecting access to finance. 
58 Recall that the conventional loan-loss provisioning is tied to loan delinquency, and that implies that in good times, the 
banking sector does not to need to hold provisions, while in bad times, they need to increase provisioning once delinquencies 
appear. Traditionally, this lowers their available capital and their ability to extend lending (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-
Herrero, 2010).  
59 All other measures in Table (1) are not significant. 
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Table (1): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variables: Finacc1=Financial Access Variable (PCA of Financial Markets Access and Financial Institutions Access to capture overall access within  
an economy); Finacc2= Financial Access Variable (PCA of Bank Branches, Accounts, and ATMs per 100,000 people; % of Adults) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Finacc1 Finacc1 Finacc1 Finacc1 Finacc2 
      
AR(1) 0.950*** 0.931*** 0.949*** 0.939*** 0.956*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0244) (0.0141) (0.0154) (0.0171) 
Unemployment -0.00136*** -0.00134** -0.00134** -0.00143*** 0.382 
 (0.000492) (0.000658) (0.000618) (0.000428) (0.354) 
Secondary enrolment 0.000257** 0.000301* 0.000210 0.000359*** 0.0405 
 (9.94e-05) (0.000162) (0.000141) (0.000112) (0.101) 
Urbanization  0.000247** 0.000336** 0.000341** 0.000198 -0.00815 
 (0.000111) (0.000142) (0.000131) (0.000134) (0.118) 
Openness -3.19e-05 1.28e-05 -1.88e-06 -2.75e-05 0.164*** 
 (2.32e-05) (3.11e-05) (2.38e-05) (2.18e-05) (0.0522) 
lt_liquidity   -0.0102*    
  (0.00598)    
lt_DTI   -0.00935*   
   (0.00515)   
lt_Provisioning      
      
Dynamic provisioning    0.00652*  
    (0.00360)  
Provisioning     0.0932*** 
     (0.0343) 
Observations 950 542 542 661 234 
Number of code 100 55 55 81 43 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                
Order 2 p-value                
 
0.000 
0.879 
 
0.000 
0.889 
 
0.000 
0.927 
 
0.000 
0.710 
 
0.171 
0.724 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LT refers to loosening/tightening of macroprudential tools from Shim et al’s (2013) Database 
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The estimation results of the Hansen test for all the estimation tables confirm that the p-value 
is large, ensuring the validity of the overidentifying restrictions, and cannot be rejected. These 
results warrant the correct selection of instruments in such a way that they are not correlated 
with the error term. The results also confirm that there are no issues of omitting imperative 
variables from the model, ensuring that the chosen models are correctly specified. 
Column (5) introduces an alternative financial inclusion measure that is comprised of the 
principal component analysis of bank branches, ATM machines, and accounts. It is a pure focus 
on access to financial institutions, whereas the other columns include access to financial 
markets as well. This time, the significant variable captures provisioning, a similar result to the 
other columns; provisioning as a macroprudential tool is found to increase financial inclusion 
by 9% (relative to 0.6% in the other columns) suggesting the importance of provisioning for 
financial access within the banking sector, more so than within financial markets. 
 Table (2) introduces an alternative measure of financial inclusion representing the usage of 
financial services. This variable represents the principal component of borrowers and 
depositors (per 1000 adults) within the financial system.  In line with the results in table (1), it  
shows that a one notch tightening in provisioning increased usage of financial services by 22%. 
All other financial inclusion measures were not significant. 
Table (2): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy   
Dependent variable: Depositors and Borrowers from the Banking Sector (Principal Component Analysis of Both 
depositors and borrowers with commercial banks per 1000 adults) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (7) 
VARIABLES  
  
AR(1) 1.016*** 
 (0.0262) 
Unemployment 1.107 
 (2.489) 
Secondary enrolment -0.570 
 (0.401) 
Urbanization 0.594 
 (0.407) 
Openness -0.0791 
 (0.132) 
Provisioning 0.226* 
 (0.118) 
  
Observations 221 
Number of code 33 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                     
Order 2 p-value                     
 
0.183 
0.333 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We then highlight the results of borrowers alone versus depositors alone to understand how 
macroprudential policies affect both of them. Table (3) outlines the results of our GMM 
regressions with borrowers as our dependent variable. Three interesting results emerge. First, 
tightening RRRs (Column (1)) increases borrowers at commercial banks by 5 individuals (per 
1000 adults). This result is in line with Pearlman (2015) and Pearlman and Mirza (2017) who 
shows that there is a distributional effect of RRRs, with gains to borrowers when the RRR is 
tightened, as more potential borrowers are effectively able to borrow. Column (2) and (3) show 
that imposing countercyclical reserve requirements,60 and financial-institution-targeted61 
instruments62 increases financial inclusion by 42.3 and 10.8 individuals (per 1000 adults) 
respectively. With the addition of macroprudential tools, other explanatory variables lose 
significance.63  
Table (4) displays additional macroprudential policies having an impact on borrowing. Most 
specifically, imposing taxes on financial institutions reduces borrowers by around 44 
individuals (per 1000 adults) as can be shown in Column (1).  This is an expected results as 
higher taxes on financial institutions could be translated into higher surcharges on the 
commercial banks’ clients if banks seek to maintain their profitability. This, in turn, reduces 
the number of borrowers from commercial banks.  Columns (2) and (3), however, show that 
provisions and limits on domestic currency loans - which aims to limit credit growth - increases 
the number of borrowers. Once again, this could be interpreted as a rise in the number of 
borrowers, but borrowers obtain smaller amounts, which increases access (and usage) of 
financial services (Pearlman 2015 and 2017).   
                                                             
60 Another RRR measure from an alternative data, which captures restrictions to RRRs either by i) imposing a wedge on 
foreign currency deposits or ii) operates countercyclically. 
61 Instruments focused on financial institutions, rather than those targeting borrowers - as shown in Column 7 - and includes 
dynamic provisionings, countercyclical reserve requirements, limits on systemically important financial institutions. It is an 
aggregate instrument that captures the measures that target financial institutions. Annex I contains the full breakdown of the 
variables constituting this measure.   
62 Rather that instruments targeting borrowers.  
63 With urbanization and secondary enrolment showing some significance in additional tables as shown in Annex V. 
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Table (3): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy Dependent variable: Borrowers from the Banking Sector: Borrowers from commercial banks per 1,000 adults 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
    
AR(1) 1.008*** 0.986*** 1.023*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0190) (0.0277) 
Unemployment 0.657 -0.979 0.363 
 (0.913) (0.918) (0.951) 
Secondary enrolment -0.0106 0.110 -0.112 
 (0.183) (0.180) (0.198) 
Urbanization 0.0953 -0.0634 -0.268 
 (0.216) (0.173) (0.282) 
openness -0.0189 0.113 0.0659 
 (0.0694) (0.0689) (0.0881) 
lt_RR 4.761**   
 (1.970)   
Counter-cyclical RRR  42.27***  
  (11.54)  
Fin-Inst Targeted Macropru   10.80** 
   (5.215) 
    
Observations 261 287 287 
Number of code 41 46 46 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           
Order 2 p-value                               
 
0.042 
0.283 
 
0.044 
  0.186 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Overall MPI reflects all macroprudential policies in use. Borrower-Targeted Macropru focuses on LTV and DTI 
ratios; Financial Institutions (Fin-Inst) reflect macroprudential tools focused on financial institutions. 
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Table (4): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy   
Dependent variable: Borrowers from the Banking Sector: Borrowers from commercial banks per 1,000 adults 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
    
AR(1) 1.032*** 1.050*** 1.023**
* 
 (0.0339) (0.0299) (0.0208) 
unemployment -0.579 -0.128 1.874** 
 (1.135) (0.857) (0.730) 
Secondary enrolment 0.0263 0.230 -
0.316** 
 (0.197) (0.206) (0.137) 
Urbanization 0.244 -0.263 0.0770 
 (0.219) (0.237) (0.150) 
Openness -0.0298 -0.109 0.0163 
 (0.0697) (0.0729) (0.0701) 
Tax -43.46**   
 (18.47)   
Domestic Loans Limits  25.06*  
  (13.61)  
Provisioning   0.140** 
   (0.0665) 
    
Observations 287 287 303 
Number of code 46 46 44 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                         
Order 2 p-value                         
 
0.041 
0.273 
 
0.045 
0.235 
 
0.034 
0.270 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6.2. Role of Governance 
We will now present our results when we interact governance with macroprudential 
policies, to determine the impact of regulatory/institutional quality on the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies. We already highlighted that several studies, including Beck et al. 
(2007b) and Honohan (2008) found that institutional quality increases financial inclusion. 
Table (5) summarizes our results when we include financial development and institutional 
quality/governance indicators interacted with the various macroprudential tools for our full 
sample.64 Institutional quality appears to increase both usage and access to financial 
services across the spectrum of the macroprudential tools employed, with no negative 
impact on access. Financial development, on the other hand, appears to have mixed effects 
on our results, depending on the tool employed, and with no negative impact on usage. This 
sheds light on the importance of institutional quality both from a regulatory and an 
inclusion perspective, in terms of affecting the behavior of macroprudential policies, in 
terms of how they affect financial inclusion. Financial development, on the other hand, 
yields mostly mixed results in our regressions.  
Table (5): Results with the Introduction of Governance and Financial Inclusion  
 
Table (6) presents our baseline model as before, which includes the various 
macroprudential policies, followed by their interaction with the governance indicators. As 
                                                             
64 We do not split the sample in these regressions, as by definition, AEs have better institutional quality, and higher levels of financial 
development. 
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can be seen in columns 1-4, all the interaction terms between the overall macroprudential 
index (MPI) in Column (1),65 provisioning in Column (2) and (4), and in counter cyclical 
reserve requirements in Column (3) are positive and significant. The total effect of 
macroprudential policies (presented in the last row), to signify the effect of 
macroprudential policies in the presence of improved institutional quality, also shows a 
statistically significant result, highlighting that as institutional quality improves, 
macroprudential policies increase financial inclusion. For example, Column (1) shows that 
increased use of macroprudential policies (proxied by Cerutti et al.’s (2015) overall 
macroprudential index in the presence of increased governance increases financial 
inclusion by 8% (relative to their insignificant impact on their own). 
Table (6): Access to Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy: Role of Governance 
Dependent variable: Financial Access Variable (PCA of ATMs, Branches, and Accounts) in Columns (1); (2), and Financial 
Institutions and Markets Access (PCA of access to both institutions and markets), broader definition of access in Columns (3) ;(4).  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Acc acc finacc finacc 
     
AR(1) 0.935*** 0.955*** 0.927*** 0.901*** 
 (0.00915) (0.0140) (0.0164) (0.0223) 
Unemployment -0.0170 0.500 -0.00156*** -0.000279 
 (0.468) (0.405) (0.000521) (0.000478) 
Secondaryenrol 0.186 -0.0773 0.000362*** 0.000239* 
 (0.125) (0.120) (9.75e-05) (0.000142) 
Urbanization -0.130 -0.0459 0.000358** 0.000291 
 (0.117) (0.124) (0.000150) (0.000231) 
Openness 0.217*** 0.224*** -4.89e-05* -5.70e-05 
 (0.0556) (0.0568) (2.88e-05) (3.65e-05) 
Macropru Index 3.315    
 (2.050)    
Interaction:gov_mpi 4.631***    
 (1.553)    
Provisioning  0.205***  0.000147 
  (0.0406)  (9.07e-05) 
Interaction: Gov_provisions  0.113***  0.000141** 
  (0.0286)  (5.85e-05) 
     
     
Coutnercyclical RRR   0.0192**  
   (0.00764)  
Interaction: gov_RRR   0.0803***  
   (0.0270)  
Total Effect of Macropru & Governance66 7.946***   
(2.929) 
0.318*** 
(.0533) 
0. .0995***   
(0.0318) 
.0002885** 
(0.00012) 
     
Observations 198 234 811 776 
Number of code 42 43 92 88 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                    
Order 2 p-value                    
 
0.072 
0.851 
 
   0.171 
   0.749 
 
   0.000                           0.000 
  0.862                            0.931 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; lincom implies linear combination to calculate total effect 
Table (7) presents the results of the usage of macroprudential policies, combining both borrowers 
                                                             
65 Represents all macroprudential policies employed per country.  
66 That is, the effect of macroprudential policies conditional on governance/institutional quality. 
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and users using principal component analysis. In this case, only the general countercyclical 
capital buffer/requirement yielded a positive and significant result on usage of financial 
services,67 whereby the (total) effect of macroprudential policies almost doubles as institutional 
quality improves.  
Table (7): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Depositors and Borrowers from the Banking Sector (Principal Component Analysis of Both) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) 
VARIABLES  
  
AR(1) 1.007*** 
 (0.0290) 
unemployment 0.584 
 (3.012) 
secondaryenrol -0.478 
 (0.542) 
urbanization 0.879** 
 (0.394) 
openness 0.00342 
 (0.169) 
Countercyclical Capital 
Buffer/Requirement (CTC) 
93.29** 
 (38.71) 
Interaction: gov_CTC 118.8*** 
 (42.38) 
Effect of Macroprudential 
Policies under findev 
(lincom) 
212.13*** 
(72.96) 
  
Observations 204 
Number of code 36 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                       
Order 2 p-value                       
 
0.154 
0.205 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; lincom implies linear combination to calculate total effect 
Table (8) presents our results using borrowers as the dependent variable. We observe that the same 
variables as before displayed positive statistical significance, in addition to limits on domestic loans 
(CG: Column (3)). The interaction terms have been significant except for taxes, provisioning, and the 
financial-targeted instruments.68 However, the total effect of macroprudential policies69 was 
significant in increasing financial inclusion, across all variables in Table (11), except for Columns (4) 
and (5), for provisioning and RRRs.  Column (6) includes another measure of RRR tightening based 
on our own data collection relative to Column (5) from Shim et al.’s (2013) database, and our variable 
was positive and significant when interacted with institutional quality, confirming earlier findings.  
 
                                                             
67 Otherwise, results were insignificant. 
68 Note the mixed effect of the RRR in this table, versus its significance in the baseline regression.  
69 Conditional on improved institutional quality. 
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Table (8): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Borrowers from Commercial Banks (per 1000 adults) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
         
AR(1) 1.035*** 1.026*** 1.044*** 1.020*** 1.016*** 0.978*** 0.958*** 1.006*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0334) (0.0333) (0.0220) (0.0298) (0.0228) (0.0195) (0.0227) 
unemp 0.102 -0.480 -0.221 1.812** 0.604 0.667 -1.009 0.540 
 (1.381) (1.223) (0.934) (0.688) (0.969) (0.861) (0.924) (1.096) 
secondaryenrol -0.0341 0.0315 0.475** -0.313** 0.0148 0.0312 0.163 -0.0541 
 (0.205) (0.202) (0.221) (0.138) (0.212) (0.180) (0.176) (0.221) 
urb 0.0676 0.259 -0.457* 0.0833 0.0461 0.197 0.0662 -0.311 
 (0.143) (0.229) (0.243) (0.149) (0.267) (0.166) (0.244) (0.272) 
openness -0.0195 -0.0391 -0.217** 0.0180 -0.0295 -0.0653 0.0690 0.0527 
 (0.0611) (0.0688) (0.0877) (0.0724) (0.0757) (0.0780) (0.0842) (0.0944) 
Countercyclical Capital 
Buffe (CTC) 
40.56        
 (28.43)        
Interaction: gov_ctc 30.88*        
 (17.52)        
Taxes  -46.09**       
  (20.68)       
Interaction: gov_tax  8.712       
  (23.02)       
Domestic Loans Limit 
(cg) 
  47.14**      
   (18.15)      
Interaction: gov_cg   48.44*      
   (27.67)      
provisioning    0.138**     
    (0.0685)     
Interaction: 
gov_provisioning 
   -0.0296     
    (0.0471)     
lt_RR     4.760**    
     (2.310)    
Interaction: gov_lt_rr     4.765    
     (5.258)    
lt_rr2      6.762   
      (4.147)   
Interaction: gov_lt_rr2      12.35**   
      (5.423)   
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Countercyclical reserve 
requirement (rrrev) 
      62.14***  
       (12.55)  
Interaction: gov_rrrev       79.87*  
       (43.77)  
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
         
Fin-Target Macropru        12.55** 
        (6.131) 
Interaction: gov_fintgt        5.548 
        (4.840) 
Effect of 
Macroprudential 
Policies under findev 
(lincom) 
71.44*  
(43.446) 
-37.37* 
(22.754) 
95.58 ** 
(43.398) 
0.109                 
(0.0977) 
9.524 
(6.997) 
19.12** 
(8.195) 
142*** 
(2.83) 
18.102** 
(9.794) 
         
Observations 287 287 287 303 261 339 287 287 
Number of code 46 46 46 44 41 47 46 46 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                       
Order 2 p-value                       
 
0.046 
0.183 
 
0.041 
0.275 
 
0.048 
0.306 
 
0.034 
0.270 
 
0.028 
0.288 
 
0.021 
0.455 
 
0.041 
0.333 
 
0.045 
0.212 
 
 
        
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LT RR2; based on our own compilation of RRRs, and converting based on Shim et al’s (2013) scale to reflect loosening or tightening. lincom implies linear 
combination to calculate total effect 
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Table (9) presents alternative usage measure capturing depositors, and with the exception of Column 
(5), which represents the magnitude of tightening (or the rate of change of the reserve requirements), 
macroprudential policies appear to have a positive and significant impact on depositors. Interestingly, 
two other measures capturing the RRRs show their positive impact; variables capturing their 
countercyclicality (Column (3)) and tightening and loosening (Column (1)). The last row represents 
the total effect, and confirms this pattern for most regressions, showing that the impact of 
macroprudential policies in the presence of governance increases the number of depositors. Overall 
results point towards the fact that institutional quality matters for the effectiveness of the 
macroprudential policies employed, and that improved governance increases financial inclusion as a 
result of the implementation of macroprudential policies. Overall, our results point towards the 
importance of governance - as a proxy for institutional and regulatory quality - in affecting the 
behavior of macroprudential policies, whereby the usage of macroprudential policies improves 
financial regulation in the presence of better governance. 
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Table (9): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Depositors in Commercial Banks (per 1000 adults) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
        
 AR(1) 0.968*** 0.984*** 0.969*** 0.958*** 0.960*** 0.997*** 0.983*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0114) (0.0320) (0.0272) (0.0190) (0.0149) (0.0343) 
Unemployment  0.402 2.006 -1.635 -1.494 -0.833 -1.071 0.855 
 (1.265) (1.937) (3.512) (1.231) (1.848) (1.307) (3.449) 
Secondaryenrolment  -0.921** -1.740*** -0.340 -1.588** -0.577 -0.756** -1.049 
 (0.439) (0.589) (0.647) (0.752) (0.460) (0.352) (0.672) 
Urbanization  2.319*** 2.939*** 1.372 1.925** 2.184*** 0.941 0.399 
 (0.559) (0.710) (1.049) (0.728) (0.673) (0.638) (0.904) 
Openness  0.263** 0.186 0.434*** -0.0440 0.205 0.240** 0.629** 
 (0.103) (0.149) (0.160) (0.291) (0.176) (0.118) (0.293) 
lt_RRR 3.457       
 (8.796)       
Interaction: gov_lt_RRR 21.26**       
 (10.55)       
lt_Risk Weights  109.0*      
  (62.24)      
Interaction: gov_lt_Risk Weights  -68.72      
  (76.25)      
Countercyclial Capital Buffer   111.1***     
   (40.54)     
Interaction: Gov_Capital Buffer   185.9     
   (152.4)     
RRR    152.1*    
    (79.45)    
Interaction gov_rr    11.35    
    (30.65)    
RRR (change)     -8.819   
     (5.915)   
Interaction: gov_rrr chane     -17.20*   
     (9.319)   
provisioning      0.396**  
      (0.198)  
Interaction: gov_provisioning      0.0382  
      (0.191)  
Concentration limits        115.2** 
       (51.89) 
Interactions: gov_concentration limit       2.644 
       (51.64) 
Total Effect of Macroprudential Policies 24.72                   40.27          297.02 *             163.41*                      -26.021*                    0.4347*           117.834 
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under findev (lincom) (16.375) (46.654) (159.12) (96.08) (15.074) (0.2444)  (87.665) 
        
Observations 369 259 427 519 483 452 427 
Number of code 55 37 64 67 64 58 64 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           
Order 2 p-value                        
 
0.018 
0.737 
 
0.030                     0.056       
0.666                     0.758 
 
0.038 
0.990 
 
            0.031      
        0.846        
 
                0.049 
                0.676 
 
0.056 
0.714 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  lincom implies linear combination to calculate total effect 
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6.3.Role of Financial Development 
Table (10) highlights results when we include a proxy for financial development- capturing the 
depth and efficiency of a country’s financial sector- and interacting this variable (findev) with our 
macroprudential indicators.70 In these regressions, we have mixed results on the impact and 
effectiveness of macroprudential policies. Column (1) indicates that the interaction of the RRR 
with financial development lowers access to finance, while the RRR on its own has no impact, a 
result that contrasts previous findings in our baseline regressions, and upon the introduction of 
governance indicators.  The total effect (the last row) confirms the negative impact of the RRR as 
a result of increased financial development. Similar results are obtained using the LTV ratio 
(Column 5), but this is an expected result. Limits on the fraction of liabilities held by the banking 
sector or by an individual in Column (3) also yielded a negative impact on financial access. Only 
taxes appear to have a positive impact on access in Column (2).  
Table (10): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Financial Access Variable (PCA of ATMs, Branches, and Accounts) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
AR(1) 1.028*** 0.932*** 0.944*** 1.000*** 1.021*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0383) (0.0177) (0.0152) 
Unemployment  0.253 -1.176 -1.178 0.471 -3.024* 
 (0.663) (0.899) (0.891) (0.495) (1.642) 
Secondaryenrolment  0.0433 0.367* 0.275 -0.0386 0.0236 
 (0.165) (0.201) (0.225) (0.113) (0.220) 
urbanization -0.0574 -0.0210 -0.0947 0.0468 0.385* 
 (0.175) (0.222) (0.171) (0.132) (0.197) 
Openness  0.0294 0.198*** 0.196** 0.120** -0.0142 
 (0.0596) (0.0700) (0.0776) (0.0486) (0.0441) 
lt_RRR 8.207     
 (5.463)     
Interaction: findevv_lt_rr -140.3**     
 (66.06)     
Tax   -60.42    
  (37.86)    
Interaction: findevv_tax  369.4*    
  (198.0)    
Inter-bank exposure   27.11   
   (16.41)   
Interaction: findevv_interbank 
expsure 
  -94.63*   
   (54.27)   
                                                             
70 We are mainly interested in the role of financial development interacted with macroprudential policies, so we do not report the 
coefficients of the financial development variables. Nor do we include them in our regressions. Econometrically, researchers either 
include one or both variables within an interaction term depending on the research question examined.  
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RRR change71    1.311*  
    (0.778)  
Interaction: findevv_drr_act    -10.25  
    (10.47)  
lt_ltv     14.03 
     (10.81) 
findevv_lt_ltv     -65.96** 
     (30.39) 
Effect of Macroprudential 
Policies under findev 
(lincom) 
-132.1306** 
(61.32) 
309.02** 
(171.48) 
-67.51 
(49.84)   
-8.94               (9.75)  -51.92 ** 
(21.57) 
Observations 172 198 198 220 85 
Number of code 36 42 42 44 19 
 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value             
Order 2 p-value             
 
0.046 
0.786 
 
0.053 
0.617 
 
0.077 
0.945 
 
 
0.024 
0.520 
 
 
0.087 
0.112 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table (11) shows that that risk weights (Column (1)) also have a negative impact on inclusion 
when interacted with financial development, while provisioning and the (countercyclical) reserve 
requirement appear to have a positive impact. Risk weights generally make it costly for banks to 
extend loans (Shim et al., 2013) so this result is expected.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
71 Actual RRRs values not dummies 
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Table (11): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Financial Access Variable (PCA of ATMs, Branches, and Accounts) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
AR(1) 0.913*** 0.939*** 0.946*** 0.922*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0146) (0.0217) (0.0266) 
Unemployment  -0.00189*** -0.00134** -0.00126*** -0.000615* 
 (0.000637) (0.000525) (0.000404) (0.000353) 
Secondaryenrol  0.000413** 0.000309*** 8.50e-05 0.000297** 
 (0.000165) (0.000106) (0.000130) (0.000122) 
Urbanization  0.000388*** 0.000258* 0.000241* 0.000212* 
 (0.000137) (0.000137) (0.000125) (0.000127) 
Openness  1.17e-05 -2.56e-05 -3.76e-05 -6.04e-05 
 (2.93e-05) (2.12e-05) (4.04e-05) (3.69e-05) 
lt_Risk Weights (RW) 0.0158    
 (0.00986)    
Interaction: findevv_lt_RW -0.0639**    
 (0.0291)    
Countercyclical RRR  -0.00779   
  (0.00922)   
Interaction: findevv_rrrev  0.176**   
  (0.0852)   
RRR   0.0172*  
   (0.00906)  
Interaction: findevv_rr   0.0176  
   (0.0232)  
provisioning    2.35e-05 
    (6.69e-05) 
Interaction: findevv_prov    0.000316* 
    (0.000173) 
     
Effect of Macroprudential 
Policies under findev (lincom) 
    -.048**   
(0.2630) 
0.167  **              
(0. 0792)  
0.0348 
(0.02582) 
0.0003       
(0.0001) 
Observations 542 811 950 776 
Number of code 55 92 100 88 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           
Order 2 p-value                               
 
0.000 
0.810 
 
0. 000 
0.861 
 
0.000      0.000        
0.866      0.835 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  
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Table (12) shows the results of usage of financial services whereby both depositors and borrowers, 
comprise our dependent variable (using principal component analysis).  Unlike access to financial 
services in Table (11), all the results within Table (12) showing that macroprudential policies, in 
the presence of financial development leads to a positive and significant impact on usage of 
financial services.  Interestingly, the strongest results are those concerning the LTV and DTI ratio 
in Columns (5) and (6). Columns (5) and (6) show that tightening the LTV ratio and DTI ratios 
lowers usage- both depositing and borrowing- by 36% and 45% respectively. However, their 
interaction with financial development alters this result, whereby they both become positive and 
significant.  Even more so, the total effect of tightening both LTV ratios and debt o income ratios 
continues to be positive and significant. All other tools in this table display a positive and 
statistically significant impact on usage of financial services.  
 Upon dividing usage from Table (12) into borrowers (Table 13), and depositors (Table 14) only 
two variables, required reserves and levies, appear to have a positive impact on usage in the 
presence of financial inclusion. What is important to observe here is that macroprudential policies 
do not appear to have a negative impact on usage of financial services when we account for 
financial development.   
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Table (12): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Usage of Financial Services, borrowers and depositors in commercial banks (per 1000 adults).  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES DepBor DepBor DepBor DepBor DepBor DepBor DepBor 
        
AR(1) 0.996*** 0.998*** 0.990*** 1.005*** 1.003*** 0.984*** 1.013*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0223) (0.0208) (0.0174) (0.0186) (0.0168) (0.0191) 
Unemployment 1.206 1.148 3.079* 0.286 0.0220 0.0812 -0.649 
 (2.674) (1.986) (1.646) (1.473) (1.716) (2.476) (1.928) 
Secondaryenrolment -0.261 -0.651 -0.790** -0.0762 -0.307 -0.488 -0.463 
 (0.671) (0.548) (0.331) (0.557) (0.486) (0.560) (0.425) 
Urbanization 0.792 0.567 1.114** 0.756 1.055** 0.888* 1.026** 
 (0.547) (0.725) (0.413) (0.546) (0.478) (0.472) (0.398) 
Openness -0.254* 0.0413 -0.00422 -0.325*** -0.217* 0.110 -0.0778 
 (0.138) (0.161) (0.129) (0.107) (0.124) (0.161) (0.114) 
Borrower-Targeted Macropru -22.36***       
 (7.978)       
Interaction: findevv_borrtrg 218.9***       
 (56.63)       
Financial_Inst Targeted Macropru  3.844      
  (7.785)      
Interaction: findevv_fintgt  73.69*      
  (40.41)      
rr_act   -0.562     
   (0.622)     
Interaction: findevv_rr_act   8.777*     
   (4.952)     
ltv_cap    -39.19**    
    (16.52)    
Interaction: findevv_ltv_cap    250.6***    
    (75.76)    
Ltv     -36.30**   
     (16.20)   
Interaction: findevv_ltv     173.3**   
     (69.34)   
DTI      -45.65**  
      (21.08)  
Interaction: findevv_dti      595.4***  
      (191.8)  
Countercyclical Capital Buffer       116.5** 
       (56.24) 
Interaction: findevv_countercyclial 
capital buffer 
      -3,354 
       (2,526) 
        
Effect of Macroprudential 
Policies under findev (lincom) 
196.56*** 
(55.54) 
77.53** 
(37.96) 
  8.22*  
(4.719) 
211.37*** 
(71.50) 
136.99*** 
(66.67) 
549.76*** 
(183.28) 
-3237.65 
(2475.45) 
        
        
Observations 198 198 208 198 198 198 198 
Number of code 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                         
Order 2 p-value                         
 
0.182 
0.372 
 
0.192        
0.377 
 
0.168 
0.407 
 
0.181 
0.399 
 
 
0.181 
0.395 
 
 
   0.181 
    0.342 
 
 
0.184 
0.284 
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Table (13): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Borrowers from commercial banks (per 1000 adults).  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES borrowers_banks borrowers_banks 
   
AR(1) 0.982*** 0.986*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0222) 
Unemployment  2.105*** 2.139 
 (0.587) (1.998) 
Secondaryenrolment  -0.231* -0.371 
 (0.118) (0.259) 
Urbanization  0.249* 0.415* 
 (0.135) (0.239) 
Openness  -0.00748 0.0612 
 (0.0628) (0.0847) 
RRR (actual) -0.693  
 (0.587)  
Interaction: findevv_rr_act 8.253**  
 (3.457)  
lt_LTV  42.16* 
  (24.11) 
Interaction: findevv_lt_ltv  -112.6 
  (93.57) 
Total Effect 7.560** 
(3.023) 
-70.47             (71.086) 
   
Observations 303 133 
Number of code 46 23 
   
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           
Order 2 p-value                               
 
0.35 
0.262 
 
0..088 
0.360 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table (14): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Depositors in commercial banks (per 1000 adults).  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
AR(1) 0.982*** 0.970*** 0.993*** 0.999*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0237) (0.0335) (0.0147) 
Unemployment 1.822 -4.293* -2.217 -1.200 
 (2.861) (2.405) (2.267) (1.870) 
Secondaryenrolment -1.694** -0.329 -0.821 -0.661 
 (0.686) (0.499) (0.694) (0.410) 
Urbanization 2.902*** 2.074*** 0.0280 1.669*** 
 (0.767) (0.731) (0.938) (0.578) 
Openness 0.219* 0.295* 0.580* 0.202 
 (0.120) (0.152) (0.347) (0.188) 
lt_Risk Weights (RW) 95.96**    
 (46.21)    
Interaction: findevv_lt_rw -66.46    
 (108.5)    
Levies  -184.0***   
  (65.19)   
Interaction: findevv_lev  327.4***   
  (118.3)   
Concentration Limits   141.1***  
   (46.75)  
Interaction: findevv_conc   -31.48  
   (177.7)  
LTV Ratio    -63.92** 
    (30.93) 
Interaction: findevv_ltv    57.30 
    (84.74) 
Total Effect 29.502               (76.178) 143.35**          (70.309) 109.616             (173.854) -6.614 
(71.1241) 
     
Observations 259 421 421 421 
Number of code 37 63 63 63 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           
Order 2 p-value                               
 
0.029 
0.718 
 
0.059 
0.600 
 
0.059 
0.561 
 
0.060 
0.546 
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7. Robustness checks 
For robustness we employed a significant number of additional explanatory variables including 
alternative measures of education, dependency ratios, fiscal and investment data, value added 
by industry, investment, household expenditure, GDP per capita, inflation, savings, and interest 
rates. Most of them, however, were not significant. We also performed cross-sectional 
regressions (OLS and 2SLS), with the results differing, particularly for the former due to 
endogeneity, using alternative definitions of financial inclusions.  
Conclusions and Policy Implications   
We have attempted to analyze the impact of macroprudential policies on financial inclusion in 
a panel of 67 countries over the period 2000-2014. Using System-GMM regressions, we find 
that macroprudential policies have mixed effects on financial inclusion, and the results vary by 
the level of governance and institutional quality. Overall provisioning appears to have a 
consistently positive impact on financial inclusion, both in terms of access, and usage of 
financial services, while debt to income ratios and LTV ratios reduced it. Reserve requirements, 
particularly if implemented countercyclically, had a positive impact on financial inclusion, a 
result that supports some of the theoretical research recently conducted. Even more so, reserve 
requirements have a positive impact on financial inclusion when implemented with better 
governance and financial development.  
Governance, and institutional quality appear to improve the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policies in a way that does not jeopardize financial inclusion.   Financial development helps 
macroprudential policies improve usage of financial services - both borrowing and depositing 
- but does not significantly help in increase financial access.  This is a plausible argument as it 
is assumed that higher development could potentially translate into higher financial access, and 
macroprudential policies would not necessarily affect it. Macroprudential policies, thus appear 
to increase the usage of financial services as financial development increase, among those 
already financially included.   
As for governance, we find that improved institutional quality increases both financial access, 
and usage, with limited adverse effects either on usage or access. Our results point to important 
policy implications. A country’s level of institutional quality and financial development plays 
an important role in the effectiveness of macroprudential policies. Specifically, an 
improvement of institutional quality, irrespective of a country’s level of financial development, 
increases the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in boosting financial inclusion, a result 
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not necessarily achieved without the presence of strong institutions, and increased levels of 
financial development. These findings are important as they shed light on the importance of 
institutional quality in improving the effectiveness of macroprudential policies. 
Overall the benefits of macroprudential policies on their impact on financial inclusion appears 
to outweigh their costs. Given the importance of financial inclusion for financial stability, we 
are inclined to believe that macroprudential policies contribute to financial stability given their 
impact on financial inclusion. While some unintended - negative - consequences exist, 
institutional quality in particular appears to help dampen those negative consequences.   
Further research will assess the interaction of both macroprudential policies and financial 
inclusion on financial stability, as well as the impact of the various macroprudential tools on 
firm access to finance and compare them to household access to finance, to reach even more 
robust conclusions. Using alternative measures that capture institutional quality (International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) or Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), and 
macroprudential policies will be a useful extension to test the robustness of the presented 
results, in addition to using actual values of macroprudential policies to examine the magnitude 
of their impact on financial inclusion   is also important. We believe that this is an unexplored 
area with potential for further analysis on the role of financial inclusion for macroprudential 
policies.
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Annex I 
Table (1): List of Advanced Economies included in the Sample72 
Australia Hong Kong Portugal 
Austria Ireland Singapore 
Belgium Israel Slovakia 
Canada Italy Slovenia 
Cyprus Japan South Korea 
Czech Republic Luxembourg Spain 
Denmark Malta Sweden 
Finland Netherlands Switzerland 
France New Zealand United Kingdom 
Germany Norway United States 
Greece     
Table (2): List of EMs included in the Sample 
Albania Bulgaria Hungary Macedonia Philippines 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Algeria Burundi India Malaysia Poland Tunisia 
Angola Chile Indonesia Mauritius Qatar Turkey 
Argentina China Jamaica Mexico Romania Ukraine 
Azerbaijan Colombia Jordan Montenegro 
Russian 
Federation 
Uruguay 
Bahrain Costa Rica Kazakhstan Morocco Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Belize Croatia Kuwait Oman Serbia Venezuela 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Ecuador Latvia Pakistan South Africa   
Botswana Egypt Lebanon Paraguay Sri Lanka   
Brazil 
El 
Salvador 
Lithuania Peru Thailand   
 
                                                             
72 Country Classification is based on the IMF 
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Table (3): Definition of Variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Name Definition Source
Financial Institutions Access Bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 adults
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Financial Markets Access
Percent of market capitalization outside of top 10 largest companies and Total number of issuers of 
debt (domestic and
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Account (% age 15+) [ts]  Percent of respondents who report having an account (by themselves or together with someone else). World Bank Findex Database
Account at a financial institution (% age 15+) [ts]
 Percent of respondents with an account (self or together with someone else) at a bank, credit union, 
another financial institution (e.g., cooperative, microfinance institution), or the post office (if 
World Bank Findex Database
Automated teller machines (ATMs) (per 100,000 
adults)
Automated teller machines are computerized telecommunications devices that provide clients of a 
financial institution with access to financial transactions in a public place.
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Bank accounts per 1,000 adults IMF Financial Access Survey
Commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults)
Commercial bank branches are retail locations of resident commercial banks and other resident banks 
that function as commercial banks that provide financial services to customers and are physically 
separated from the main office but not organized as legally separated subsidiaries.
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Borrowers at commercial banks per 1,000 adults
Number of resident customers that are nonfinancial corporations (public and private) and households 
who obtained loans from commercial banks and other banks functioning as commercial banks per 
1000 adults.
IMF Financial Access Survey
Depositors with commercial banks per 1,000 
adults
Reported number of deposit account holders at commercial banks and other resident banks 
functioning as commercial banks that are resident nonfinancial corporations (public and private) and 
households. 
IMF Financial Access Survey
Financial Institutions Depth 
Private-sector credit to GDP ;Pension fund assets to GDP ; Mutual fund assets to GDP ;Insurance 
premiums, life and non-life to GDP
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Financial Markets Depth
Stock market capitalization to GDP; Stocks traded to GDP; International debt securities of government 
to GDP; Total debt securities of financial corporations to GDP; Total debt securities of nonfinancial 
corporations to GDP
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Unemplyment Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate) WDI
Secondaryenrol Progression to secondary school (%) WDI
Urbanization Urban population (% of total) WDI
Terms of Trade Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100) WDI
Savings Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) WDI
Financial Development 
A measure capturing financial depth (size and liquidity of markets),  and 
financial efficiency in financial markets and financial institutions  (ability 
of institutions to provide financial services at low cost and with 
sustainable revenues, and the level of activity of capital markets). IMF FD Database
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Table (4): Macroprudential Tools  
Tool Definition Source 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Constrains highly levered mortgage downpayments by enforcing or 
encouraging a limit or by determining regulatory risk weights. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Debt-to-Income Ratio Constrains household indebtedness by enforcing or encouraging a 
limit. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Time-Varying/Dynamic 
Loan-Loss Provisioning 
Requires banks to hold more loan-loss provisions during upturns. 
Cerutti (2015) 
General Countercyclical 
Capital 
Buffer/Requirement  
Requires banks to hold more capital during upturns. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Leverage Ratio Limits banks from exceeding a fixed minimum leverage ratio. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Capital Surcharges on 
SIFIs 
Requires Systemically Important Financial Institutions to hold a higher 
capital level than other financial institutions. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Limits on Interbank 
Exposures 
Limits the fraction of liabilities held by the banking sector or by 
individual banks. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Concentration Limits Limits the fraction of assets held by a limited number of borrowers. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Limits on Foreign 
Currency Loans 
Reduces vulnerability to foreign-currency risks. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Reserve Requirement 
Ratios 
Limits credit growth; can also be targeted to limit foreign-currency 
credit growth. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Limits on Domestic 
Currency Loans 
Limits credit growth directly. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Levy/Tax on Financial 
Institutions 
Taxes revenues of financial institutions. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps Restricts to LTV used as a strictly enforced cap on new loans, as 
opposed to a supervisory guideline or merely a determinant of risk 
weights. Cerutti (2015) 
FX and/or Countercyclical 
Reserve Requirements 
Restricts to RR which i) imposes a wedge of on foreign currency ; or 
ii) is adjusted countercyclically  
Cerutti (2015) 
Overall Macroprudential 
Index  
An index capturing the measures included in Cerutti's index if they 
were implemented; LTV ratios, Dti ratios, concentration limits, 
counter-cyclical capital buffer, taxes on financial institutions, capital 
surgecharests on SIFIs. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Borrower-Targeted 
Instruments 
An index reflecting macroprudential policies that target borrowers; 
Debt to Income Ratio and Loan to Value Ratio 
Cerutti (2015) 
Financial Institution-
Targted Instruments  
An index capturing macroprudential policies that target financial 
incstitutions; dynamic provisionings, countercyclical capital buffers, 
and RRR's, levies, surcharges on systemically important financial 
institutions, limits on interbank exposurs, concentation limits, foreign 
currency limites, and limits on domestic currency loans Cerutti (2015) 
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LT_Liq Losening/Tightening Liquidity Requirements 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
rr_act 
Actual Required Reserve Ratio Figures 
Authors' 
Collections  
Credit Growth Limits 
Imposition of a quantitative ceiling on the rate of credit growth over a 
specific period of time 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
Risk Weights 
Higher risk weights makes it more expensive for banks to extend 
particular types of loans (e.g. housing loans) 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_LTV Losening/Tightening LTV 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_Provisioning Losening/Tightening LTV 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_Risk credit growth 
limits Losening/Tightening of monthly limits on credit growth 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_Taxes Losening/Tightening Taxes 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_RR2 Losening/Tightening of required reserve based on our own collections 
Authors' 
Collections  
LT_LTV Losening/Tightening LTV 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_LTV Losening/Tightening LTV 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
rr magnitude 
Reflects changes in required reserve ratios to show the extent of the 
change and its impact 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_Expo 
Exposure Limit 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
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Table (5): Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Urbanization 1,921 62.05214 22.19357 8.352 100 
Unemployment 1,594 8.923777 6.646062 0.1 57 
Openness 1,909 92.24231 59.22104 19.1008 442.62 
Secondary Enrolment 1,458 87.66564 23.79722 13.77945 166.8085 
Financial Institution Depth 1,665 0.3310777 0.2832979 0.0045977 1 
Financial Institution Access 1,665 0.3948678 0.2894931 0 1 
Financial Institution Efficiency 1,665 0.5929839 0.1414308 0.0906417 0.8792366 
Financial Markets Depth 1,665 0.3106568 0.3026897 0 0.9994659 
Financial Markets Access 1,665 0.3089447 0.3185427 0 1 
Financial Markets Efficiency 1,665 0.3292632 0.3658282 0 1 
ATMS 1,213 50.81656 47.24685 0 290.14 
Bank Accounts 551 710.6393 570.0839 0.41 3371.49 
Bank Branches 1,275 20.78522 19.96302 0.45 257.7 
Provisioning 1,266 73.62769 46.63855 0 604.07 
LTV Caps 1,456 0.1641484 0.3705374 0 1 
Debt to Income Ratio 1,456 0.125 0.3308325 0 1 
Dynamic Provisioning 1,456 0.0776099 0.2676486 0 1 
Countercyclical Capital Requirements 1,456 0.0178571 0.1324776 0 1 
Levies 1,456 0.1229396 0.3284806 0 1 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
Surcharges 1,456 0.0096154 0.097619 0 1 
Interbank Exposure Limits 1,456 0.2527473 0.4347366 0 1 
Concentration Limits 1,456 0.6057692 0.4888527 0 1 
LTV ratio caps 1,456 0.2156593 0.4114203 0 1 
Taxes 1,456 0.1195055 0.3244938 0 1 
Limits on Domestic Currency Lending 1,456 0.0947802 0.2930118 0 1 
Countercyclical Reserve Requirements 1,456 0.1565934 0.3635419 0 1 
Reserve Requirements 1,939 0.8509541 0.3562256 0 1 
Foreign Currency Limits 1,459 0.107608 0.3099909 0 1 
Overall Macroprudential Index 1,456 1.854396 1.580624 0 8 
Borrower Targeted Instruments 1,456 0.3166209 0.6533223 0 4 
Financial Targeted Instruments 1,456 1.565247 1.322759 0 6 
Required Reserve Ratio (Actual data collection) 1,669 7.332819 7.441161 0 80 
Losening/Tighening_ rr 1,142 0.0140105 0.9133233 -6 10 
Losening/Tighening_ liq 741 0.0080972 0.2985357 -3 6 
Losening/Tighening_ cr 741 0.0013495 0.0821884 -1 1 
Losening/Tighening_ ltv 741 0.048583 0.3894747 -1 5 
Losening/Tighening_ dti 741 0.0350877 0.241302 -1 2 
Losening/Tighening_ rw 741 0.0215924 0.2314891 -1 1 
Losening/Tighening_ prov 741 0.0296896 0.236377 -1 3 
Losening/Tighening_ expo 741 0.0013495 0.1423673 -2 1 
Losening/Tighening_ tax 741 
-
0.0107962 0.3818759 -3 2 
Losening/Tighening_ rr2 1,674 0.0298686 0.5652344 -2 2 
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rrmag 1,570 
-
0.0578917 2.742392 -56 20 
Governance: Corruption 1,824 0.1411042 1.047821 -1.722249 2.469991 
Governance: Government Effectiveness 1,815 0.2628747 0.9552625 -2.058268 2.436975 
Governance: Political Stability 1,812 
-
0.0247487 0.9542523 -2.810035 1.760102 
Governance: Regulatory Quality 1,814 0.2867892 0.9054986 -2.027446 2.260543 
Governance: Rule of Law 1,824 0.1610754 0.990082 -2.178493 2.100273 
Governance: Voice and Accountability 1,824 0.1135349 0.9391642 -1.907197 1.800992 
Borowers within Commercial Banks (per 1000 
adults) 669 231.6199 219.2247 0.0182538 1232.996 
Depositors within Commercial Banks (per 1000 
adults) 898 1365.367 1253.939 2.162313 7987.93 
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